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INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the Texas Constitution was amended to allow Texas homeowners to obtain loans using the equity in their homesteads as collateral.' However, this constitutional amendment contains numerous
1. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6) (amended 2003).
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provisions that restrict the availability of these loans by placing limitations on both borrowers and lenders.2 One such limitation is a restriction that limits fees, exclusive of interest, that can be charged to the
borrower in a home equity transaction to three percent of the loan's
original principal amount.3
The constitutional amendment did not define what constituted a fee
for purposes of a home equity loan,4 and this ambiguity has created
much concern among lenders.5 This Comment argues that a loan origination fee 6 charged by a lender in a home equity transaction should
be considered interest and not a fee for purposes of the three percent
fee limitation.7 Part II of this Comment will discuss homestead protection in Texas and the 1997 constitutional amendment authorizing
home equity lending. Specifically, Part II will discuss the three percent fee limitation, the forfeiture and cure provisions contained in the
constitutional amendment, and the problems inherent in interpreting
what constitutes a fee for purposes of the cap on fees. Part III will
discuss the potential charges to a borrower in a hypothetical home
equity transaction by defining and describing the varying lender and
non-lender charges. Part IV will discuss how interest and fees have
historically been defined under Texas law. Part V will discuss whether
the legislature intended a different definition of interest and fees for
2. See id. §§ 50(a)(6)(A)-(Q) (amended 2003).
3. Id. § 50(a)(6)(E).
4. See id. § 50(a)(6) (amended 2003); see also Julia Patterson Forrester, Home
Equity Loans in Texas: Maintaining the Texas Tradition of Homestead Protection, 55
SMU L. REV. 157, 171 (2002) (recognizing that the amendment does not identify
which fees are included in the fee cap); Patton L. Zarate, Comment, An Ailing System: Possible Solutions for Curing the Texas Home Equity Loan Amendment, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 461, 487 (2000) (acknowledging that the constitutional amendment gives
no direct guidance with regard to which fees are included in the fee cap).
5. The topic for this Comment was suggested by Karen M. Neeley, General
Counsel for the Independent Bankers Association of Texas, and of counsel for the law
firm of Long, Burner, Parks & DeLargy. Ms. Neeley indicated that there is much
concern in the lending industry regarding what constitutes a fee for purposes of the
cap on fees and specifically whether an origination fee charged by a lender falls within
the three percent fee cap. See Zarate, supra note 4, at 511 (stating that "[tihe many
risks associated with the [a]mendment is cause for great worry among Texas lenders"); Jack Hams, Forging Ahead in the Brave New World of Home Equity Lending,
TEX. BANKING, Sept. 1998, at 32, 32-33 (indicating that "many lenders [were] taking,
at best, a cautious approach to home equity lending," in part, because of the "lack of
clarity in the law about exactly what is included in the definition of 'fees'").
6. A loan origination fee is a fee charged by the lender at the origination of the
loan and is intended to compensate the lender up front for the expense associated
with originating the loan. See J. Alton Alsup, Pitfalls (And Pratfalls) of Texas Home
Equity Lending, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 437, 442 (1998) (indicating that
"[Ijenders typically attempt to recover their overhead and direct costs of loan origination through the charging of a so-called 'origination fee' at loan settlement"); Zarate,
supra note 4, at 490 (indicating that an origination fee is "charged to cover expenses
associated with making a loan").
7. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(E) (setting forth the fee limitation without defining what constitutes a fee or providing a definitional reference).
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purposes of the three percent cap on fees. Part V will also examine
the language of the pertinent section of the constitutional amendment,
applying the rules of statutory construction in Texas, and will discuss
how Texas regulatory agencies interpret the amendment.
Part VI will discuss four recent judicial interpretations of the constitutional amendment relative to the classification of points and/or origination fees in Texas home equity transactions. Part VI will also
discuss a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court interpreting the
cure provision contained in the constitutional amendment and its application to a violation of section 50(a)(6)(E). In addition, Part VI
will provide a summary of recent home equity cases.
Part VII will discuss the relevant policy considerations in classifying
interest and fees for purposes of home equity lending in Texas and
lender options for dealing with the problem created by the uncertainty
of whether a loan origination fee constitutes interest or a fee. Part
VII will also discuss the 2003 amendment to the Texas Constitution on
home equity lending, to the extent that the amendment addresses the
problem of interpretation and the process by which a lender or note
holder may cure a violation of the home equity law. Finally, Part VIII
will summarize why loan origination fees should be considered interest and not fees for purposes of home equity lending in Texas.
II.

THE ARRIVAL OF HOME EQUITY LOANS IN TEXAS

In 1997, Texas lawmakers proposed a constitutional amendment
that, subject to voter approval, authorized home equity loans in
Texas.8 In November of that year, Texas voters approved the constitutional amendment, 9 effectively making Texas the final state in the
union to authorize home equity lending. 10
A.

Constitutional Protection of the Texas Homestead

For over 150 years, the Texas Constitution has provided for the protection of Texas homeowners from the judgment liens of creditors.1 1
In fact, prior to 1995 the only valid liens against a Texas homestead
were those securing "debts for purchase money, improvements, or
taxes." 2 In 1995, minor revisions were made to the Texas Constitution, including the allowance of a valid lien pursuant to a court order
or written agreement in a divorce proceeding, but the constitution still
did not allow Texas homeowners to obtain loans secured by the equity
8. See Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
9. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6) (amended 2003); Alsup, supra note 6, at
437 (indicating that the constitutional amendment was carried by nearly sixty percent
of the popular vote).
10. See Forrester, supra note 4, at 158.
11. See, e.g., Alsup, supra note 6, at 437.
12. Forrester, supra note 4, at 159. See TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50(a) (amended
1995).
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in their homesteads.1 3 Thus, with the passage of the 1997 constitutional amendment, home equity loans became available to Texas
homeowners for the first time in Texas history.' 4
B.

The 1997 ConstitutionalAmendment

The 1997 constitutional amendment authorizes certain voluntary
liens on a Texas homestead. 5 These voluntary liens must be created
by an agreement in writing with consent from the owner and the
owner's spouse. 6 They may be foreclosed only by court order, 17 and
the loan agreement cannot create personal liability for the borrower,
absent fraud by the borrower in obtaining the credit. 8 Thus, the
lender's only recourse in the event of default, absent fraud by the borrower, is to foreclose on the property.' 9
There are a number of lender restrictions and consumer protection
provisions contained in the constitutional amendment.2 0 Of these
provisions and or restrictions, this Comment will focus on the three
percent cap on fees and the forfeiture and cure provisions.2 1 In addition, this Comment will discuss the problems inherent in interpreting
the constitutional amendment.2 2
1. The Three Percent Cap on Fees
In accordance with the constitutional amendment, lenders cannot
require the borrower "to pay, in addition to any interest, fees to any
person that are necessary to originate, evaluate, maintain, record, insure, or service the extension of credit that exceed, in the aggregate,
three percent of the original principal amount of the extension of
credit. '23 Therefore, it becomes important to determine what constitutes a fee and what constitutes interest for purposes of home equity
lending in Texas. 24 Should Texas lenders rely on the existing statutory
definitions or regulatory interpretations for purposes of home equity
lending? 25 Should they rely on the distinction between interest and
13. See TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50(a) (amended 1995); Forrester, supra note 4, at
159 & n.13.
14. See Forrester, supra note 4, at 159.
15. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(A).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 50(a)(6)(D).
18. Id. § 50(a)(6)(C).
19. See id. §§ 50(a)(6)(C)-(D).
20. See id. §§ 50(a)(6)(A)-(Q) (amended 2003); Forrester, supra note 4, at 165
(noting that the amendment's requirements are mainly "measures designed to protect homeowners from unscrupulous lenders or from the consequences of a bad
decision").
21. See infra Parts II.B.1-2.
22. See infra Parts II.B.3.
23. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(E).
24. See discussion infra Parts IV-VI.
25. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, V.B.
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fees established by Texas case law in usury cases?2 6 Did the legisla-

ture intend to treat the classification 27of interest and/or fees differently
for purposes of home equity loans?

2.

The Forfeiture and Cure Provisions

The 1997 constitutional amendment called for the note's lender or
holder to forfeit the loan's principal and interest if the lender or
holder did not comply with its obligations in a home equity transac-

tion and further failed to correct said violation within a reasonable

period of time after notification by the borrower. 28 Assuming a
lender can only obtain a valid lien on the homestead by strict compliance with the constitutional amendment,2 9 may a lender who violated
the fee cap still validate its lien by correcting the violation within a
reasonable period of time after notification? 3"
3.

The Problem of Interpretation

The constitutional amendment authorizing home equity loans
leaves Texas lenders and borrowers with many questions. 31 Unfortunately, the constitutional amendment did not contain a section providing definitions of the terms used in the amendment.32 Further, the
amendment did not delegate interpretative authority to any legislative

26. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
27. See discussion infra Part V.A.
28. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended 2003). Section
50(a)(6)(Q)(x) was amended in 2003 to provide a process under which certain violations of the Texas home equity law may be cured; the reasonable time requirement
was stricken and replaced with a requirement that the lender or note holder correct
the violation within sixty days after notification by the borrower. See infra Part VII.C.
29. See id. § 50(c).
30. See discussion infra Part VI.B; TEX. CONST. art XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)
(amended 2003) (indicating that a lender can cure a violation by correcting said violation within a reasonable time after notification by the borrower without providing
whether said cure will validate the lien).
31. There are a number of legal articles or comments which discuss the issues
raised by the constitutional amendment authorizing home equity lending including
the following: Alsup, supra note 6, at 441-70; Charles C. Boettcher, Comment, Taking Texas Home Equity for a Walk, but Keeping it on a Short Leash!, 30 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 197, 233-58 (1999); Forrester, supra note 4, at 169-73; Mark D. Morris, Implementing a Texas Home Equity Lending Program-Documentationand Operational
Issues, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 471, 471-82 (1998); Michael K. O'Neal, Update
on Texas Home Equity Lending, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 117, 117-25 (2002);
Zarate, supra note 4, at 484-507; Hams, supra note 5, at 32-33.
32. See TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6) (amended 2003).
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or regulatory body.3 3 Thus, barring legislative action to amend the
constitution, the issue of interpretation was left to the courts.3 4
Acknowledging the problem of interpretation created by "[t]he fact
that most of the provisions regarding implementation of home equity
lending reside in the constitution," the Office of Consumer Credit
Commissioner, in conjunction with the Department of Banking, the
Savings and Loan Department, and the Credit Union Department, issued the Regulatory Commentary on Equity Lending Procedures.
The Commentary represents the opinions of the four state agencies
that regulate the entities making home equity loans in Texas.36 The
stated purpose of the Commentary is to "provide guidance to lenders
and consumers concerning the regulatory views of the meaning and
effect" of the constitutional amendment authorizing home equity
lending. 37 Although the Commentary specifically states that the views
expressed in the Commentary will be used to assess compliance with
the requirements of the amendment in both examination and enforcement situations, the issuing agencies acknowledge that the courts may
choose not to defer to the Commentary's interpretations in resolving
disputes between borrowers and lenders.3 8 Even so, the Commentary
is presently "the most significant statement '39 of how state regulators
are interpreting the new home equity law.4 ° Further, because the
Texas Supreme Court cited the Commentary in its evaluation of the
issues raised in Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.,a" it is likely "entitled to some weight as persuasive authority."4 2
III.

POTENTIAL CHARGES IN A HOME

EQuITY

TRANSACTION

43

In a typical home equity transaction, the borrower may be required
to pay certain fees, in addition to interest, that are associated with the
33. See id.; see also Boettcher, supra note 31, at 222 (indicating that one problem
with the amendment is that the legislature did not pass enabling legislation which
would have allowed for a regulatory agency to interpret the amendment's provisions);
Zarate, supra note 4, at 501 (indicating that the legislature granted no regulatory authority to any state agency over home equity lending).
34. See Zarate, supra note 4, at 504. In 2003, Texas lawmakers addressed the issue
of interpretation during the regular session of the 78th legislature. See infra Part
VII.C.
35. OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM'R, REGULATORY COMMENTARY ON EQUITY LENDING PROCEDURES 1 (1998) [hereinafter COMMENTARY].

36. See id.

37. Id.
38. See id.

39.
40.
41.
42.

O'Neal, supra note 31, at 119.
Id.
23 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2000).
O'Neal, supra note 31, at 120; see also Stringer, 23 S.W.3d at 357 (citing to the

COMMENTARY).

43. The author has over twenty-three years experience in the banking business

and is familiar with the varying lender and non-lender charges associated with
residential real estate transactions.
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origination of the loan.4 4 Because the constitutional amendment authorizing home equity loans limits the fees, exclusive of interest, "necessary to originate, evaluate, maintain, record, insure, or service the
extension of credit," 45 to three percent of the loan's original principal
amount, 46 an understanding of the basis for each charge 47 is necessary
in order to determine what constitutes a fee versus what may be properly classified as interest. 48 To assist in that determination, this section
will distinguish between those charges retained by the lender 49 and
those paid to third parties.5 °
A.

Lender Charges

Lender charges are the fees and interest amounts retained by the
lender in connection with the transaction. 51 They can take varying
forms, but common lender charges include discount points, origination fees, commitment fees, underwriting fees, credit report fees, and
interest.i
1.

Discount Points

Discount points are a percentage of the loan paid up front by the
borrower and are typically associated with a buy-down of the interest
rate.53 For example, a lender might offer its customers varying interest rate options depending upon the amount of discount points the
borrower is willing to pay upon closing of the loan.54 The following
chart represents a hypothetical example of how discount points can be
used to buy-down the contract interest rate on a $50,000 home equity
loan with a term of fifteen years:

44. See, e.g., COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 3-4.
45. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(E).
46. Id.
47. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
48. See discussion infra Parts IV-VI.
49. See discussion infra Part III.A.
50. See discussion infra Part III.B.
51. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 442 (discussing several charges retained by the
lender).
52. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 3-5 (describing several charges incidental
to a real estate transaction); Alsup, supra note 6, at 442 (discussing several types of
lender charges used to recoup the cost of originating the loan, including itemized
charges for specific services rendered).
53. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 445; Morris, supra note 31, at 474; Zarate, supra
note 4, at 488.
54. See Zarate supra note 4, at 488 (indicating that "many borrowers elect to
lower the interest rate over the life of their loan" by the payment of points at closing).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

7

TexasTEXAS
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
10 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 14
REVIEW

1.
2.
3.
4.

Contract Rate on Loan 5 5
Discount Points Paid Up-Front
Monthly Payment Amount 56
Corresponding APR 57

[Vol. 10

Option "A"

Option "B"

Option "C"

8.50%
0
$492.37
8.50%

8.00%
1
$477.83
8.17%

7.50%
2
$463.51
7.83%

In this hypothetical, the borrower can obtain a fifteen-year loan at
eight and one-half percent or he can choose to pay one percent of the
loan amount up front and receive an eight percent rate on the loan.
This means that the borrower pays $500 up front to obtain the lower
rate for the life of the loan.5 For Federal Truth in Lending purposes,
a discount point is considered a prepaid finance charge, 59 and the
amount of the fee is subtracted from the principal amount of the loan
and added to the finance charge to determine the annual percentage
rate paid by the borrower.60 If the borrower wishes to have an even
lower rate on the home equity loan, choosing Option "C" would require payment of discount points totaling two percent of the loan
amount. In this case, the borrower would pay $1,000 to buy a seven
and one-half percent rate for fifteen years.6 1
2.

Origination Fees

A loan origination fee is calculated the same way as a discount
point.62 An origination fee is a percentage of the original principal
amount of the loan charged to the borrower at the origination of the
loan. 63 Most lenders charge origination fees to cover their up-front
cost associated with making a loan.64 For Federal Truth in Lending
purposes, an origination fee is treated exactly like a discount point
55. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 444. The nominal contract or note rate of interest
does not take into account "all other charges by the lender in connection with the
loan that constitute interest" under Texas law. Id.
56. Notice that there is a corresponding reduction in the monthly payment amount
as the rate is reduced. Thus, in Option "C" the borrower would pay $1,000 up front in
discount points and have monthly payments $28.86 lower than if the borrower had
paid no discount points. The actual payment amount could vary slightly from those
used in this hypothetical depending on the method of calculation.
57. The Annual Percentage Rate or APR is defined as "a measure of the cost of
credit, expressed as a yearly rate." 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(1) (2003). This hypothetical
assumes one month to the first payment and that there are no other charges affecting
the APR.
58. $50,000*1%=$500.
59. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2(a)(23), .4(a), .4(b)(3) (2003).
60. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18(b), .22(a) (2003).
61. $50,000*2%=$1,000.
62. See Morris, supra note 31, at 474 (indicating that points refer to both origination fees and discount points); Alsup, supra note 6, at 445 (discussing an origination
fee in terms of a percentage of the loan amount); Zarate, supra note 4, at 490
(describing an origination fee in terms of a percentage of the loan amount).
63. See Morris, supra note 31, at 474.
64. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 442; Zarate, supra note 4, at 490.
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because the amount of the fee is subtracted from the loan amount and
added to the interest charge to determine the annual percentage rate
paid by the borrower.65 Thus, under our hypothetical, a one percent

loan origination fee would equate to $500 paid by the borrower at the
origination of the loan. 66 In the hypothetical above, if the lender customarily charged a one percent loan origination fee in addition to the
contract interest rate on all its home equity loans, then the borrower
would pay this charge regardless of the loan rate structure chosen.6 7
Likewise, the lender might offer home equity loans without a loan
origination fee. In this scenario, the lenders would likely factor the

cost of originating these loans into the interest rates they charge on
their loans so as to recover their up-front cost over the life of the loan.

3. Other Potential Lender Charges
In addition, there are other charges that may be assessed by lenders

in residential real estate transactions which may or may not be
charged to home equity borrowers. 68 For example, a lender might

charge a commitment fee, an underwriting fee, or a credit report fee
in conjunction with the origination of the loan.69 Commitment fees
are generally paid to the lender for a commitment to make a loan at a
future date.7" Underwriting fees are fees charged by some lenders to
analyze the borrower's credit and capacity to repay the loan.7 ' Un-

derwriting fees are typically paid up-front at the time of application or

upon the closing of the loan.72 The credit report fee is generally

charged by the lender to offset the lender's cost in obtaining the borrower's credit report.7 3

65. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4(a), .4(b)(3), .18(b), .22(a) (2003).
66. $50,000*1%=$500.
67. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 445 (suggesting that the payment of an origination
fee does not reduce the interest rate).
68. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 3-5 (describing some of the possible fees
in addition to interest and indicating that there is no prohibition against the lender
absorbing some of the fees). There are also statutory limitations on the types of fees
that can be charged in connection with a secondary mortgage loan where the interest
rate on the loan exceeds ten percent. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 342.002, .004-.005,
.307-.308, .502 (Vernon Supp. 2003); COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 4-5 (indicating
that in addition to the limitation on fees contained in the constitutional amendment,
"secondary mortgage loans" are also subject to a limitation on the "types of fees that
may be charged").
69. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 442 (indicating that the lender may charge itemized
fees for specific services rendered); supra note 68.
70. A commitment fee is defined as "[a]n amount paid to a lender by a potential
borrower for the lender's promise to lend money at a stipulated rate and within a
specified time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 266 (7th ed. 1999).
71. See Home Equity Loan Information: A Consumer Guide to Home Equity
Loans, at http://www.home-equity-loan-information.com/home-equity-costs.html (last
visited July 2, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
72. See id.
73. See COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 3.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

9

Texas
WesleyanWESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.
10 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 14
TEXAS
LAW
REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 10

Non-Lender Charges

In addition to the charges imposed by the lender, there are expenses incidental to the origination of a home equity loan that are
paid to third parties.74 Examples include: 1) appraisal fees to thirdparty appraisal companies for determining the value of the property;
2) title insurance to protect the lender in the event there is a title
defect; 3) attorney's fees for preparing the loan documentation; 4) filing fees; 5) escrow fees to the title company for acting as the escrow
agent in the transaction; 6) courier fees; 7) survey fees; 8) broker's
fees; and 9) flood zone fees for evaluating and monitoring whether the
property lies in a flood zone.7 5 These fees may or may not be incurred
in any given transaction and may or may not be charged to the borrower depending on the circumstances. 7 6
IV.

DEFINING INTEREST AND FEES UNDER TEXAS LAW

A.

Texas Statutes and Regulations

Interest is defined in the Texas Finance Code as "compensation for
the use, forbearance, or detention of money. ' 77 The Texas Administrative Code defines prepaid interest as "[i]nterest paid separately in
cash or by check before or at consummation in a transaction, or withheld from the proceeds of the credit at any time."' 78 The code further
indicates that terms including points, discounts, and origination fees
are often used to identify prepaid interest. 79 For purposes of charges
on secondary mortgage loans, the Texas Administrative Code provides that a lender may charge "[p]repaid interest in the form of
points, such as origination or discount points ... so long as the total
amount of interest contracted for, charged, or received, when spread
over the full term of the loan ...does not exceed the applicable interest limit" provided for by Texas law." ° Thus, it would appear that
Texas, by statute and by regulation, classifies points and loan origination fees as interest rather than fees.8 '
B.

Texas Case Law in Usury Cases
In determining what constitutes "compensation for the use, forbearance, or detention of money, "82 Texas courts have historically treated
fees retained by the lender as interest for purposes of the state's usury
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
sumer
79.
80.
81.
82.

See, e.g., id. at 3-4.
See id.
See supra note 35.
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 1.102(20) (West 2003) (Fin. Comm'n of Tex., ConCredit Regulation).
Id.
7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.701(b).
See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4) (defining "interest").
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laws, except where the charge "entitle[s] the borrower to a distinctly
separate 83and additional consideration apart from the lending of
money.,
In Texas Commerce Bank-Arlington v. Goldring,84 the Texas Supreme Court considered a case where a borrower sued a bank for
usury because the bank required him to pay, in addition to interest,
attorney's fees incurred by the bank in the collection of the note and
incurred in defending the borrowers' title in the property pledged as
collateral.8 1 The court stated that a charge which "entitle[s] the borrower to a distinctly separate and additional consideration apart from
the lending of money" was not interest and could not form the basis of
usury.8 6 The court held that the services performed by the attorneys
did not constitute interest as it was "consideration in addition to the

simple lending of money. "87

In Stedman v. Georgetown Savings & Loan Ass'n,8 8 the Texas Supreme Court considered a case where the plaintiff paid the lender a
commitment fee for an option to obtain a permanent loan. 89 After
obtaining the permanent loan, the plaintiff sued the lender claiming
the commitment fee when combined with interest on the note constituted usury. 90 The court stated that to constitute usury "'there must
be an overcharge by [the] lender for the use and detention of the
lender's money.' 91 Holding that the commitment fee charged did not
constitute interest, the court stated that a bona fide commitment fee
does not constitute interest because the fee purchases an option which
binds the lender to make a loan in the future, and thus "'entitles the
borrower to a distinctly separate and additional consideration apart
from the lending of money."92
83. Tex. Commerce Bank-Arlington v. Goldring, 665 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1984);
see also Stedman v. Georgetown Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1979);
Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976)
(citing Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709, 712); Greever, 140 Tex. 64, 165
S.W.2d at 712 (originating the test to determine whether a charge constitutes a fee or
interest in usury cases: whether the charge gives the borrower separate consideration
apart from the loan itself); Walker v. Ross, 548 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1977) (per curiam), writ ref'd n.r.e., 554 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1977) (indicating that
a fee charged by a lender is interest unless it is a valid charge other than "for the use,
forbearance or detention of money"); Terry v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.(quoting Greever, 140 Tex. 64,
165 S.W.2d at 712).

84. 665 S.W.2d 103.
85. Id. at 104.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 595 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1979).
89. Id. at 487.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 488 (quoting Crow v. Home Sav. Ass'n of Dallas County, 522 S.W.2d 457
(Tex. 1975)).
92. Id. (quoting Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903,
906 (Tex. 1976)).
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In Gonzales County Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman,9 3 the Texas
Supreme Court considered a case where the lenders charged a two
percent loan fee to the borrowers in conjunction with the closing of a
$38,400 loan to construct two homes for resale.9 4 The borrowers sued
the lender claiming that the loan fee constituted interest and rendered
their loan usurious.9 5 The lender claimed that the fee was consideration for making available a permanent loan to the Freemans in the
future. 96 However, the lender also testified that the loan fee was intended to compensate the lending company for expenses associated
with negotiating the loan. 97 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender, but the appeals court reversed. 98 While
affirming the appellate court's judgment,9 9 the supreme court addressed the issue of what constitutes interest under Texas law.10 0 The
court stated that "[a] charge which is in fact compensation for the use,
forbearance or detention of money is, by definition, interest regardless
of the label placed upon it by the lender."10 1 However, the court further stated that "a fee which commits the lender to make a loan at
some future date does not fall within this definition" ' 2 because the
fee "entitles the borrower to a distinctly separate and additional consideration apart from the lending of money. ' 10 3 The court noted that
the loan fees at issue were listed on the settlement statement as an
expense associated with the $38,400 loan.10 4 Finding that the lender
failed to establish the fee's true nature, the court affirmed the court of
05
civil appeal's judgment.1
In Terry v. Teachworth,1 °6 the Houston Court of Civil Appeals considered a case where the lender charged the borrower an origination
fee of $7,125 and a fee for other extraordinary services of $15,000, in
addition to interest on the loan.10 7 The borrower brought suit against
the lender claiming that the loan was usurious.10 8 The lender argued
that the extraordinary services fee was for "distinct services rendered
in the nature of cost and disbursement control and construction supervision."10 9 The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling that such
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976).
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 905-06.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 909.
See id.
Id. at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908-09.
431 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
See id. at 924.
Id. at 919-20.
Id. at 923.
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amounts constituted interest and rendered the loan usurious. 1 ° In its
analysis, the court relied on precedent stating, "[A] lender may, without violating the usury law, make an extra charge for any distinctly
separate and additional consideration.""' Further, the court stated
that whether a charge was in fact "'distinctly separate and additional
consideration"' was a fact question for a jury 1 2 and finding no reversible error in the case, the
court upheld the lower court's holding that
13
the loan was usurious.
In Walker v. Ross,'1 4 the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals considered a case where the borrower executed a note to the lender for
$55,000 and only received $50,000 in loan proceeds.1 15 The borrower
claimed that under the terms of the loan, the lender would borrow the
money from a bank and the borrower would pay an additional $5,000
plus the interest that the bank charged the lender." 6 The lender
claimed he charged the additional $5,000 for promotional work he did
for the borrower, for the loss he took in a real estate venture in which
the parties were involved, and for his services in obtaining a loan from
the bank." 7 The trial court entered judgment for the lender finding
the charge was not interest.1 1 The appellate court reversed and remanded the case," 9 holding that the fee charged by the lender was
interest because it was "for the use and detention of money.' 120 The
court stated, "that where the face amount of the loan is greater than
the amount actually advanced, the principal upon which the lender
may charge interest is the amount advanced, and the difference
(where there are no valid charges) is considered prepayment of interest., 1 2 1 In deciding the case, the court further distinguished between a
fee charged by a broker, who arranges a loan by bringing the parties
together, and a fee charged by a lender. 122 While the fee charged by
the broker for obtaining a loan is not interest, the fee charged by the
lender is interest, because it "is
compensation for the use, forbear123
ance, or detention of money.,
Thus, the current test for determining whether a charge constitutes
a fee or interest in usury cases is whether the charge "entitle[s] the
110. Id. at 924.
111. Id. at 925 (quoting Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1942).
112. Id. (quoting Greever, 165 S.W.2d at 712).
113. Id. at 927.
114. 548 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (per
curiam).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 449.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 448.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 452.
121. Id. at 450.
122. See id.
123. Id.
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borrower to a distinctly separate and additional consideration apart
from the lending of money.' 1 24 If the borrower receives consideration
1 25
separate and apart from the lending of the money, then it is a fee.
If not separate and apart, then it is interest. 1 6 If this rule is applied to
home equity loans, loan origination fees would likely be considered
interest under Texas law 1 27 because they represent compensation to
the lender in connection with the lending
of money, and the borrower
28
receives no additional consideration.
V.

INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT-DID

THE

TEXAS LEGISLATURE INTEND A DIFFERENT DEFINITION
OF INTEREST AND FEES FOR PURPOSES OF THE

THREE PERCENT CAP ON FEES?

A.

The Rules of Statutory Construction or the Plain
Meaning Doctrine

In interpreting the constitution, Texas courts "rely heavily on its literal text and must give effect to its plain language.' 29 They "strive to
give constitutional provisions the effect their makers and adopters intended"1 3 and to "avoid a[ny] construction that renders any provision
meaningless or inoperative." 13 ' Further, "[i]n construing a constitutional amendment,
[the courts] may also consider its legislative
32
history."
The issue is whether a loan origination fee, charged by a lender in a
home equity transaction, is properly classified as interest or as a fee
for purposes of the three percent cap on fees.1 3 3 The relevant part of
the Texas Constitution states,
The homestead of a family, or of a single adult person, shall be, and
is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts
except for: ... an extension of credit that: ... does not require the
owner or the owner's spouse to pay, in addition to interest, fees to
any person that are necessary to originate, evaluate, maintain, record, insure, or service the extension of credit that exceed, in the
124. See supra note 83.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 82-123 and accompanying text.
128. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 442 (indicating that "[lenders typically attempt to
recover their overhead and direct costs of loan origination through the charging of a
so-called 'origination fee' at loan settlement"); Zarate, supra note 4, at 490 (indicating
that an origination fee is "charged to cover expenses associated with making a loan").
129. Stringer v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 23 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. 2000).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.

133. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(E) (providing for a three percent cap on
fees, exclusive of interest, without defining what constitutes interest or a fee).
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To determine the proper classification of a loan origination fee, one
must first determine what constitutes interest and what constitutes a
fee required to originate a loan. 1 35 Using the dictionary to define interest13 6 and fee, 137 these definitions support the argument that a loan
origination fee 138 should be considered a fee and not interest for purposes of a home equity
loan, because a loan origination fee is a charge
1 39
to originate a loan.

Yet, as previously discussed, Texas defines interest by statute as
"compensation [allowed by law] for the use, forbearance, or detention
of money.'1 40 Further, the Texas courts have historically considered
fees retained by the lender as interest for purposes of the state's usury
laws, except where the fee "entitle[s] the borrower to a distinctly separate and additional consideration apart from the lending of money."'"
So, what was the Texas legislature's intent when it adopted the three
42
percent fee limitation contained in the constitutional amendment?
The legislative history reveals that there were three competing constitutional amendments authorizing home equity loans presented to
the House Committee on Financial Institutions during the 75th legislative session.'4 3 The three amendments presented were H.J.R. 70 by
Representative Danburg,' 4 4 H.J.R. 31 by Representative Patterson,1 4 5
134. Id.
135. Id. (providing for a three percent cap on fees, without defining interest or fee).
136. The dictionary defines interest as "[t]he compensation fixed by agreement or
allowed by law for the use or detention of money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 816
(7th ed. 1999).
137. The dictionary defines a fee as "[a] charge for labor or services." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 629 (7th ed. 1999).
138. The dictionary defines a loan origination fee as "[a] fee charged by a lender for
preparing and processing a loan." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (7th ed. 1999).
139. Zarate, supra note 4, at 490 (indicating that an origination fee is "charged to
cover expenses associated with making a loan").
140. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
141. See supra note 83.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 143-67.
143. See Audio tape: Proposing a ConstitutionalAmendment Authorizing a Voluntary, Consensual Encumbrance on Homestead Property for the Purpose of an Equity
Loan: Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 70 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Inst., 75th
Leg., R.S., Tape 1, Side A, B (March 24, 1997) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review); Audio tape: Proposing a Constitutional Amendment Permitting an Encumbrance Against Homestead Propertyfor Certain Extensions of Equity Credit: Hearings
on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Inst., 75th Leg., R.S., Tape 1,
Side A, B (March 24, 1997) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review); Audio
tape: Proposinga ConstitutionalAmendment Authorizing a Voluntary Consensual Encumbrance on Homestead Property for the Purpose of an Equity Loan: Hearings on
Tex. H.R.J. Res. 44 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Inst., 75th Leg., R.S. Tape 1, Side
A, B (March 24, 1997) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
144. Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 70, supra note 143.
145. Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31, supra note 143.
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and H.J.R. 44 by Representative Wolens. 14 6 Of the three amendments
presented, only Representative Wolens's amendment initially contained a limitation on the fees that could be charged by lenders making home equity loans.1 47 In presenting H.J.R. 44, Representative
Wolens discussed the fee limitation included in his amendment, explaining that a lender could not charge a fee of more than three percent on a first lien note or five percent on a second lien note.1 4 8 In
explaining what constituted a fee for purposes of the cap, Representative Wolens specifically included origination fees in the list of fees subject to the cap. 149 H.J.R. 44 was left pending in committee,'150 but
Representative Wolens's inclusion of origination fees in his description of those charges subject to a cap on fees1 51 suggests that at least
Representative Wolens
considered a loan origination fee to be a fee
52
and not interest.
This is especially important because Representative Wolens would
later include a three percent cap on fees as part of an amendment to
Representative Patterson's Bill, H.J.R. 31, when it was debated on the
house floor.1 53 Representative Wolens offered what he described as
the ten commandments as an amendment to Representative Patterson's constitutional amendment. 15 4 Included in the ten commandments was the three percent cap on fees, although the record is devoid
of any debate or discussion at that time as to what constituted a fee
for purposes of the cap.' 5 5 Ultimately, Representative Wolens three
percent cap on fees was adopted as an amendment to H.J.R. 31.156
Likewise, it appears that at least one member of the Senate thought
that it was possible for some fees to be interest. 1 57 This inference may
be drawn from the response of Senator Jerry Patterson to a list of
concerns contained in a letter from the "AARP" read by Senator
Moncrief. 1 58 When asked if H.J.R. 31 provided for "reasonable limits
on interest rates and fees" on home equity loans, Senator Patterson
146. Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 44, supra note 143.
147. Compare Tex. H.R.J. Res. 70, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997), and Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31,
75th Leg., R.S. (1997), with Tex. H.R.J. Res. 44, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
148. Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 44, supra note 143.
149. Id.
150. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 44, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
151. Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 44, supra note 143.
152. See id.
153. Audio tape: Proposing a Constitutional Amendment Permitting an Encumbrance Against Homestead Propertyfor Certain Extensions of Equity Credit: Hearings
on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Inst., 75th Leg., R.S., Tape 4,
Side B (May 9, 1997) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Hearings on Tex. H.R.J. Res.
31, supra note 143.
157. See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
158. Audio tape: Proposing a Constitutional Amendment Permitting an Encumbrance Against Homestead Propertyfor Certain Extensions of Equity Credit: Hearings
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replied that they were "limited by the current banking statutes in
Texas" and that he believed that limit was "currently about eighteenpercent by law."15' 9 This would suggest that Representative Patterson
believed that at least some fees are subject to the state's interest rate
ceilings and thus considered interest. 160 Next, when asked if H.J.R. 31
provided for "fair terms for home equity loans, prohibiting unfair fees
and loan provisions," Senator Patterson replied that there was a three
percent cap.1 6 This would suggest that he believed that some fees
were subject to the three percent cap on fees. 62 Taken together,
these two statements suggest that Senator Patterson realized that
some fees might be considered interest under Texas law and thus subject to the usury ceiling while other fees would fall within the three
percent cap on fees. 163
Was the legislature aware of the statutory definition of interest
under Texas law, as well as the courts treatment of fees retained by
lenders in Texas usury cases?" 6 If the legislature intended a different
treatment in the classification of fees for purposes of home equity
lending, it could have explicitly stated so in the constitutional amendment either by defining interest and fees, or by excluding lender
charged fees from the provision which excludes interest from the cap
on fees.1 65 The legislature's failure to do so suggests that the legislature did not intend a different interpretation
of interest and fees for
1 66
purposes of the three percent cap on fees.
Finally, absent a clear showing of legislative intent to the contrary,
"statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full
knowledge of the existing condition of the law.' 1 67 Is there any reason why this rule would not apply to the legislature's passage of a
proposed constitutional amendment? If, in passing a constitutional
amendment, the legislature is also presumed to have knowledge of the
current status of the law, does the legislature's silence on this issue
suggest that the legislature intended for current law to control? 16 8

on Tex. H.R.J. Res. 31 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Inst., 75th Leg., R.S., Tape 4,
Side B (May 24, 1997) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See discussion supra Part IV.
165. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6) (amended 2003) (setting forth a fee limitation, exclusive of interest, without defining what constitutes interest or a fee anywhere in the constitutional amendment).
166. See supra notes 129-64.
167. E.g., Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1975).
168. See supa notes 129-65.
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The Regulatory Commentary on Equity Lending Procedures169

Shortly after the voters approved the constitutional amendment authorizing home equity lending in Texas, the Office of Consumer
Credit Commissioner, in conjunction with the Department of Banking, the Savings and Loan Department, and the Credit Union Department, issued the Regulatory Commentary on Equity Lending
Procedures.17 0 The Commentary specifically addresses the three percent fee limitation issue and classifies fees and interest into eight categories' 7 1 including: (1) interest and fees; (2) voluntary optional fees;
(3) fees to originate; (4) fees to evaluate; (5) fees to maintain; (6) fees
to record; (7) fees to insure; and (8) fees to service. a72
The Commentary notes that interest is excluded from the three percent cap on fees and states "'interest' means interest as defined in the
Texas Credit Title and as interpreted by the courts of the state of
Texas. ' 173 The Commentary further states "charges that constitute interest under the law, including, 1for
example, points, are not fees sub74
ject to the three percent limit.'
In discussing fees to originate an equity loan, the Commentary
states that "[f]ees to originate an equity loan that are not interest fall
within the three percent limitation."' 175 Thus, it creates the presumption that there could be origination fees that fall outside the three
percent cap on fees. 1 76 It describes the fees subject to the cap as those
paid "to third parties for separate and additional consideration for activities relating to originating a loan."' 177 The Commentary suggests
that attorney's fees for document preparation are fees that fall within
the limitation. 78 Read together, these two sections of the Commentary suggest that certain loan origination fees charged by a lender, and
historically considered interest under Texas law, would fall outside 17the
9
definition of a fee for purposes of the three percent cap on fees.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

COMMENTARY,

supra note 35.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 3-4.
See id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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VI.
A.

THE HOME EQUITY CASES

Judicial Application of the Three Percent Cap on Fees to
Lender Charges

In Tarver v. Sebring Capital Credit Corp.,18 ° the Waco Court of Appeals considered a case where the lender charged the borrower $3,384
in points and $1,692 in the form of an origination fee paid to Mortgage
Plus (as compensation for work it did on the loan), while all other
costs of closing the loan were paid by the lender.1 8' These two
charges totaled four and one-half percent of the principal amount of
the loan.' 8 2 The Tarvers filed suit, claiming, in part, that the lender's
points violated the three percent cap on fees contained in section
50(a)(6)(E) and that as a result of the overcharge the loan should be
discharged and the lien invalidated.1 83 The plaintiffs argued that the
lender's points were an additional charge"8 4 paid in "consideration ' 8of5
lowering the interest rate, not in exchange for making the loan.'
They argued that this separate additional charge constituted a fee
under the current rule of law in Texas.1 86 The court responded that
"points are calculated as a percentage of the principal," just like interest, the difference being that points are collected up front and interest
is collected over the life of the loan. 18 7 The court considered the statutory definition of interest in Texas, the Texas Administrative Code,
and the Regulatory Commentary on Equity Lending Procedures
before concluding that points constitute interest under Texas law.' 8
The court further held that "'points' as defined herein are 'interest,'
18 9
not 'fees,' under section 50(a)(6)(E) of the Texas Constitution."'
Not at issue and thus not addressed by the court in Tarver was
whether the lender's origination fee constituted interest or a fee for
purposes of the three percent cap on fees. 190
What is important to note is that this court, in interpreting the plain
meaning of the constitutional amendment, chose to look to Texas law
in interpreting the amendment's plain meaning.' 9' The court stated
that: "[b]y the plain language of the [constitutional] provision, as interpreted by reference to Texas statutes and administrative regulations, we conclude that points are not 'fees' under subsection 'E,'
180. 69 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
181. Id. at 709-10.
182. Id. at 710.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 711 (quoting First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla Factory, 877 S.W.2d 285, 287
(Tex. 1994)).
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 711.
188. Id. at 712.
189. Id. at 713.
190. See id. at 710.
191. See id. at 712.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

19

TexasTEXAS
Wesleyan WESLEYAN
Law Review, Vol.LAW
10 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 14
REVIEW

[Vol. 10

because they are not charged to 'originate, evaluate, maintain, record,
insure, or service the extension of credit."" 9 2
In Pelt v. U.S. Bank Trust National Ass'n, 9 3 the Dallas Division of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
ruled that points are not fees for purposes of the three percent cap on
fees in a home equity transaction. 194 In this case, the Pelts claimed
that the lender's lien was invalid' 95 and sought to have the lender "forfeit all principal and interest on the loan secured by the property." 196
The Pelts claimed the lender violated the three percent cap on fees by
charging them $12,000 in points19 7 and by failing to cure the default
within a reasonable time after notification.1 98 The lender contended
that discount points were not fees, but interest, and thus were not subject to the limitations on fees. 199 Further, the lender claimed that if
the points were fees, they were voluntarily paid and therefore not subject to the cap on fees.20 ° The court granted the lender's motion for
summary judgment on this issue, finding "as a matter of law, that section 50(a)(6)(E) was not violated, because under Texas law discount
points are20interest
on a loan, [and] not fees related to origination of
1
the loan.
In Thomison v. Long Beach Mortgage Co.,202 the Austin Division of
the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas considered a case where a borrower brought suit against a lender, alleging
that the lender violated the three percent cap on fees contained in
section 50(a)(6)(E) of the constitutional amendment authorizing
home equity loans in Texas.2 °3 The specific issue in the case was
whether the lender's origination fee and discount points fell within the
three percent cap on fees.20 4 If either charge was determined by the
court to be a fee for purposes of the three percent cap on fees, then
the loan would be in violation of the constitutional amendment,20 5 and
therefore subject to the forfeiture provision contained in section
50(a)(6)(Q)(x).206
192. Id. at 712 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(E)).
193. No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-1093-L, 2002 WL 31006139 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2002).
194. Id. at *3.
195. Id. at *1.
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id. at *2.
199. Id. at *2.
200. See id. at *2.
201. Id.at *3.
202. 176 F. Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Tex. 2001), vacated, No. CIV.A.A:OOCA783JN,
2002 WL 32138252 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2002).
203. Id. at 715.
204. Id. at 716.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 718.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol10/iss1/14
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V10.I1.12

20

EquityEQUITY
Lending in LENDING
Texas: Are Loan
2003]Hendry: Home
HOME
INOrigination
TEXAS Fees Interest?

The court held that the lender's origination fee constituted a fee
and not interest for purposes of the three percent cap on fees, 20 7 without deciding whether a discount point fell within the limitation on
fees.20 8 It ordered the lender to "'forfeit all principal and interest of
the extension of credit."' 2 9 The court, in applying the amendment's
plain meaning, relied heavily on a literal interpretation of the constitutional amendment.2 10 Stating that "[w]hen interpreting our state constitution, we rely heavily on its literal text and must give effect to its
plain language," 2 1 ' the court found that the origination fee was a fee
for purposes of the constitutional fee cap.2 12 The court rejected the
lender's argument that the charges were interest under the law because the charge was for the borrower's use of the money, indicating
that the lender's argument was simply not helpful in providing the
court with a method for classification of the charges. 2 13 Further, the
court dismissed the lender's argument that both charges constituted
interest because the state's administrative code and case law treats
both charges as interest for purposes of usury.2 14 The court did not
dispute the lender's assertion but stated that the classification of these
fees for purposes of usury was not dispositive.215 Instead, the court
held that the constitution's plain language controlled and that interpretations in the administrative code and case law for purposes of
usury were not controlling.216 Dispositive to the court was the fact
217
that the lender had described the charge as a "loan origination fee
and that the constitutional amendment prohibited fees in excess of
three percent that were necessary to originate home equity loans.21 8
The court stated "that in instances such as this one, the stated name of
the charge is dispositive, while the purported reason for the charge is
irrelevant. '219 Acknowledging that the court's interpretation could
result in lenders playing "semantic and numerical games ' 220 by simply
changing the name of the charge to reallocate the charge to interest or
vice versa, the court stated that the only limits on such games22were
1
"[section] 50(a)(6)(E)'s cap on fees and the Texas usury laws."
207. See id. at 716.
208. See id. at 718.
209. Id. at 718 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended 2003)).
210. Id. at 716-17.
211. Id. at 716 (quoting Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 49 S.W.3d 342, 344
(Tex. 2001)).
212. See id.
213. See id. at 717.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 717-18.
218. Id. at 718.
219. Id. at 717 n.6.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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In Breaux v. United Companies Lending Corp.,22 2 the Houston Division of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas considered among other things, whether a loan origination fee
charged by a lender in a home equity transaction was a fee or interest
for purposes of the three percent fee limitation under the Texas Constitution. 2 3 The Breauxs received a $200,000 home equity loan from
Arkansas Fidelity Mortgage Corporation.2 2 4 They claimed that the
lender overcharged them in connection with the loan by charging fees,
in addition to interest, greater than three percent of the principal loan
amount.225 The fee limitation for this loan was $6,000 and the
Breauxs contended that they were charged $7,636.04 in fees. 2 2 6 Included in these fees was a mortgage lender's fee in the amount of
$2,917.31, payable to the lender.2 27
The court, in analyzing the claim, first noted that their claim was
moot in that the Breauxs had sold the home and paid off the loan in
question. 228 However, the court assumed arguendo that a present
controversy existed for consideration of the claim. 229 The court then
held, in part, that the lender had not violated the three percent fee
limitation. 230 As part of its analysis, the court considered whether the
mortgage lender's fee was a fee for purposes of the fee cap, or
whether it was interest and therefore excluded from the cap on fees.23 1
The court considered the statutory definition of interest in Texas, noting that the "[c]ourts and regulatory agencies have treated as 'interest'
any lender-retained fees or charges that are not supported by separate
and distinct consideration for the loan and the lender's ordinary overhead and expenses., 23 2 The court pointed out that the HUD-1 Settlement Statement reflected that the mortgage lender's fee was actually
an origination fee to the lender.23 3 The court found that this fee and
three other fees paid to the lender were "overhead charges retained
by the lender [and] that [they] were not supported by a separate and
distinct consideration.

'234

Accordingly, the court held that these

charges were interest and not fees for purposes of the three percent
cap on fees.235
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

No. H-99-3384 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2001) (unpublished opinion).
Id. at 9.
See id. at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
See id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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B.

JudicialInterpretation of the Cure Provision

In Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.,236 the issue of whether a
lender could cure a violation of the three percent cap on fees and thus
validate the lender's lien was decided by the Texas Supreme Court.23 7
In this case, the borrower argued that the lender could not have created a valid lien under section 50(c) of the constitution because the
lender did not comply with section 50(a)(6)(E) when the loan was
made, notwithstanding that the lender subsequently cured the violation. 23s The lender argued that the cure provision in 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)
not only serves to cure violations of the constitutional amendment's
forfeiture provisions, but also serves to "validate the lien under section 50(c)., 2 3 9 The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the lender,
holding that the cure provision contained in section 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)
at issue under
serves not only to cure the "particular lender obligation
24 °
section 50(a)(6), but also to validate the lien.
C. Summary of the Home Equity Cases
The issue of whether a loan origination fee charged by a lender in a
home equity transaction constitutes interest or a fee for purposes of
the constitutional three percent cap on fees has yet to be definitively
decided under Texas law.24 1 The two cases directly on point,
Thomison and Breaux, both being federal district court cases, came to
different conclusions.24 2 The only thing one knows for sure is that a
lender can cure a violation of the three percent cap on fees, and that
such cure will operate to validate the lender's lien.24 3
VII.

DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM

A.

Policy Considerations

Texas law has historically treated origination fees as interest. 244 So,
why treat origination fees any different for purposes of home equity? 245 To do so would unfairly subject lenders to huge risk without
236. 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001).
237. Id. at 347.
238. Id. at 345.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 347.
241. See supra notes 180-235 and accompanying text.
242. See Thomison v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718 (W.D.
Tex. 2001), vacated by, No. CIV.A. A:OOCA783JN, 2002 WL 32138252 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 9, 2002); Breaux v. United Cos. Lending Corp., No. H-99-3384 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
14, 2001) (unpublished opinion).
243. Doody, 49 S.W.3d at 347.
244. See discussion supra Part IV.
245. See Telephone Interview with C. Ed Harrell, Partner, Hughes, Watters & Askanase, L.L.P. (Oct. 17, 2002) (indicating that he did not see a reason to treat origination fees on home equity loans differently than we treated origination fees on loans
before there was home equity lending); see generally Telephone Interview with Karen
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notice under the law 2 4 6 and would contradict the principal of stare de2 47
cisis.
Further, by dealing with this problem and providing lenders
with certainty in the law, Texas consumers will benefit as will the State
of Texas.2 48
By clarifying this issue, the risk to lenders will be reduced and consumers will likely benefit.2 49 Consider the potential adverse consequences to a lender who could have an entire portfolio of home equity
loans subject to threat of total loss, or at the very least significant refund expense, not to mention the potential litigation expense. 25 ° By
removing this risk, it is likely that more lenders will be willing to enter
the market.2 51 And, with more lenders in the market and less risk
associated with these loans, the cost of borrowing will likely decline.2 52
Further, by reducing the risk in this area the secondary market for
these loans will likely improve,2 53 thereby reducing the cost and increasing the availability of home equity credit.25 4
In addition, by reducing the risk to lenders and increasing the number of market participants making home equity loans in Texas, there
will be more money available to Texas consumers to consolidate their
current obligations, to purchase products and services, or to invest in
their businesses.2 5 This may have the effect of spurring economic
growth in Texas, because consumers will see an increase in their dis-

M. Neeley, General Counsel, Independent Bankers Association of Texas, and Of
Counsel, Long, Burner, Parks & DeLargy (Oct. 15, 2002) (indicating that she believed
origination fees should be classified as interest for purposes of home equity loans
because they fall within the legal definition of interest in Texas).
246. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (providing for severe penalties for
non-compliance).
247. Stare decisis is "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
248. See infra notes 249-56.
249. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 469 (indicating that lenders will pass the risk of loss
and additional compliance cost on to consumers in the form of "underwriting standards and pricing models").
250. See infra notes 260, 262; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended
2003) (providing for the lender to relinquish the entire principal and interest for violations not corrected within a reasonable time after notification by the borrower).
251. See Hams, supra note 5, at 32 (A survey of lenders reported that "almost half
of respondents said they were offering home equity loans but were not actively promoting the product. Fewer than one-in-five were actively promoting the loans. The
remainder either had no plans to enter the field or were waiting for more market and
legal clarification.").
252. See supra notes 249, 251 and accompanying text.
253. See Alsup, supra note 6, at 469-70 (indicating that "secondary market investors in Texas equity loans will be wary of [the] risks").
254. See supra notes 249, 251.
255. See supra notes 249, 251; infra note 256.
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posable incomes via bill consolidation or because home equity credit
is available to them.2 5 6
B.

Lender Options

Some lenders may take the position that an origination fee is interest under existing Texas law2 57 and continue to charge origination
fees, taking the risk where the origination fee, if determined to be a
fee, would put the total fees charged over the three percent cap on
fees.25 8 The risk from doing so could be great.2 59 It could result 2in
60
significant forfeitures by lenders active in home equity lending.
Even if one assumes that the violation can be cured by refunding
overcharges,26 1 the cost to lenders could be significant, especially in a
class action lawsuit.26 2
On the other hand, some lenders will likely take a conservative position and stop charging origination fees on home equity loans until
the law is settled.2 6 3 These lenders will likely increase their interest
rates to cover the loss of income generated by origination fees. By
doing so, these lenders would be forced to recover their cost of
originating the loan over the life of the loan through increased interest
earnings. However, this may not be an acceptable solution for all
lenders, as the lender would bear the risk of not being able to fully
recover their up-front cost in the event of an early payoff of the loan.
Some lenders may not be willing to take the risk and consequently
elect to stay out of the home equity market altogether.2 6 4
256. See Boettcher, supra note 31, at 225 (indicating that the State of Texas would
benefit from home equity lending because of the "increase in the amount of disposable income and purchasing power" of those accessing their home equity).
257. See discussion supra Part IV.
258. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50(a)(6)(E), 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended 2003)
(providing for the lender to relinquish all principal and interest for violations not
corrected within a reasonable time after notification by the borrower).
259. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended 2003).
260. See generally Telephone Interviews with C. Ed Harrell, Partner, Hughes, Watters & Askanase, L.L.P. (Oct. 17, 2002 & Feb. 21, 2003) (indicating that if origination
fees were determined to be a fee subject to the three percent cap on fees it could have
the effect, if not cured, of destroying entire portfolios of home equity loans).
261. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended 2003) (indicating that a
lender can cure a violation by complying with its obligations under the loan agreement within a reasonable time after notification by the borrower).
262. See Telephone Interview with C. Ed Harrell, Partner, Hughes, Watters & Askanase, L.L.P. (Oct. 17, 2002) (indicating that even refunds could be costly, especially
in a class action).
263. See Hams, supra note 5, at 32 (indicating that "many lenders were taking, at
best, a cautious approach to home equity lending").
264. See Boettcher, supra note 31, at 263 (indicating that some lenders might stay
out of the home equity market because of the "restrictive nature of the lending provisions" and the penalties for non-compliance); Hams, supra note 5, at 32 (reporting in
a survey of lenders that "almost half of respondents said they were offering home
equity loans but were not actively promoting the product. Fewer than one-in-five
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The 2003 ConstitutionalAmendment

During the regular session of the 78th legislature, Texas lawmakers
passed a proposed constitutional amendment providing, among other
things, for regulatory interpretations of certain provisions of the Texas
Constitution governing home equity lending.26 5 In addition, the 2003
constitutional amendment amends the forfeiture and cure provision
contained in section 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) of the Texas Constitution, setting
forth specific criteria under which a lender or note holder can cure
most violations of the Texas home equity law.2 66 On September 13,
2003, Texas voters approved the proposed constitutional amendment 2 67 which will become effective after the election results are
certified.2 6 8
The 2003 constitutional amendment provides that the "legislature
may[,] by'statute[,] delegate one or more state agencies the power to
interpret" various provisions of the Texas Constitution on home equity lending. 2 69 Texas lawmakers did so during the 78th legislative session by passing enabling legislation, which in conjunction with the
constitutional amendment, delegates interpretative authority to two
state agencies, the State Finance Commission, and the Credit Union
Commission. 7 ° The State Finance Commission was granted authority
to issue interpretations applicable to all lenders authorized to make
home equity loans, except those regulated by the Credit Union Commission for which the Credit Union Commission was granted that authority.2 7 ' To the extent feasible, these two agencies are required by
this legislation to adopt consistent interpretations.2 7 2 Thus, the State
Finance Commission and the Credit Union Commission, upon the effective date of the 2003 constitutional amendment, will possess the
power and authority to interpret certain sections of the Texas Constitution governing home equity lending, including section 50(a)(6)(E),
27 3
which sets forth the three percent cap on fees.
were actively promoting the loans. The remainder either had no plans to enter the
field or were waiting for more market and legal clarification.").
265. See Tex. S.J. Res. 42, 78th Leg., R.S., (2003) (to be codified at TEX. CONST. art.
XVI, § 50(u)).
266. See Tex. S.J. Res. 42, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (to be codified at TEX. CONST. art.
XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)).
267. Associated Press, Results, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 14, 2003, at

27A (citing 2003 Constitutional Amendment Election, Tex. Sec'y of State, at http://
204.65.104.19/elchist.exe (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan
Law Review).
268. The Texas Constitution: Frequently Asked Questions, Tex. Sec'y of State, at
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/txconst/faq.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with
the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
269. See Tex. S.J. Res. 42, at sec. 50(u).
270. See Act of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1207, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv.
3427 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. FIN. CODE §§ 15.308, .413).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.
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The 2003 constitutional amendment also provides protection for
lenders, whose acts or omissions comply with the interpretations provided by the appointed state agencies, or whose actions are consistent
with interpretations of a state or federal appeals court; by providing
that such lender's acts or omissions shall not constitute a violation
of
2 74
the constitutional provisions governing home equity lending.
As to the forfeiture and cure provision, the 2003 constitutional
amendment provides that a lender or note holder shall have sixty days
from notification by the borrower to correct most violations of the
home equity law or to comply with the lender or note holder's obligations under the law.2 75 To cure a violation of the three percent cap on
fees, the 2003 constitutional amendment provides that a lender or
note holder must pay to the borrower, within sixty days of the date the
"lender or holder is notified by the borrower" of the violation, the
amount of any overcharge paid by the borrower in connection with
the loan. 276 Failure to correct the violation in accordance with this
provision shall subject the lender or
note holder to complete forfei277
ture of "all principal and interest.
In summary, passage of the 2003 constitutional amendment and its
enabling legislation represent a significant step toward resolving the
issue of whether a loan origination fee constitutes interest or a fee for
purposes of the three percent cap on fees. 78 One can only hope that
these regulatory agencies will promptly deal with this issue and provide guidance to both borrowers and lenders.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Historically, loan origination fees have been classified by Texas statutes and regulations as interest and not as fees. 2 7 9 Further, Texas
courts have treated fees retained by the lender as interest for purposes
of the state usury laws, except where the fee "entitle[s] the borrower
to distinctly separate and additional consideration apart from the
lending of money. "280 Most lenders charge origination fees in an effort to collect, at the closing of the loan, their up-front cost of originating the loan.2 81 Without origination fees, lenders would be forced to
recover their up-front cost over the life of the loan, presumably by
28 2
charging higher interest rates.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See Tex. S.J. Res. 42, at sec. 50(u).
Tex. S.J. Res. 42, at sec. 50(a)(6)(Q)(x).
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part VII.C.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See supra note 83.
See supra note 6.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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Further, if the legislature had intended a different treatment in the
classification of fees for purposes of home equity lending, it could
have explicitly stated so in the 1997 constitutional amendment by defining interest or fees for purposes of the cap on fees, or by excluding
lender charged fees from the provision excluding interest from the cap
on fees.2 83 Its failure to do so suggests that the legislature did not

intend a different interpretation of interest and fees for purposes of
the three percent cap on fees.28 4 Finally, the constitutional amend-

ment authorizing home equity loans provides for severe penalties for
noncompliance.285 It would be unjust to subject an innocent lender to
such penalties without notice under the law.
It is for these reasons that a loan origination fee charged by a lender
in a home equity transaction should be classified as interest and not as
a fee for purposes of the three percent cap on fees contained in section 50(a)(6)(E) of the Texas Constitution.
Paul Hendry, H
283. See discussion supra Part V.
284. See discussion supra Part V.
285. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x) (amended 2003).
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